Document Type : Original Article
Author
shiraz university
Abstract
The phenomenon of perceptual error-especially in instances where the mind, due to habituated cognitive schemas and anticipatory conceptualization, misinterprets sensory input-constitutes a central problem in empiricist epistemology and contemporary cognitive psychology. Drawing upon John Locke’s representational theory of perception, this paper argues that sensory experience is inseparably entangled with interpretive-cognitive processes. The mind, influenced by internalized patterns and behavioural conditioning, may erroneously predicate qualities upon subjects without a complete conceptual apprehension error classified in formal logic as predication before conception. By aligning Locke’s approach with Rumi’s mystical conception of habit as an epistemic veil_ as explicitly illustrated in the tale of the peasant and the cow_ it is demonstrated that habit is not merely a cognitive obstacle to the direct apprehension of truth. In Rumi’s framework, liberating perception from habitual prefiguration necessitates a suspension of preconceptions and return to unmediated spiritual receptivity_ achievable only through hayrat, hudur, and fana. This interdisciplinary inquiry seeks to synthesize logical, psychological, and mystical perspectives to offer a comprehensive model of perceptual fallibility, thus enabling a deeper reconsideration of the relation between experience, idea, and reality.
Keywords